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COMMEN'rS
THE EFFECT OF NEGLIGENCE ON REFORMATION
OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS
In considering the reformation problem many of the courts conclude
that negligence, not excused by fraud and mistake and without qualifica-
tion as to its degree, precludes reformation.' As those familiar with the
law would expect, there are points within this general view upon which
some courts take leave to disagree.
The first point of divergence is on the question of the degree of
negligence which vitiates a right to reformation. To indicate the disunit-
on the degree aspect, it is well to first consider the situation wherein tle
party seeking such relief has failed to read the instrument before signing.
For a. revelation of the tenor of those courts disregarding degree, a very
early Iowa case 2 is illustrative. In this case the court stated that all
negotiations preliminary to or contemporaneous with the written instru-
ment are merged therein, and that the party signing such instrument
without having read it or taken precautions to ascertain its contents is
bound thereby. In contrast, a later New jersey decision3 set forth the
opinion, that where a grantee paid consideration his acceptance of a deed
containing covenants inconsistent with the contract of sale, without read-
ing the same, did not disentitle him to a reformation.
To emphasize that this variance is not merely a product of the courts
around the turn of the century, a Federal case in 19391 and an Iowa
case of 19375 show a continued incompatibility on the same question.
The Federal case6 decided that the failure of a party to read the instru-
ment before signing is negligence, thereby precluding the relief of ref-
ormation. On the other side of the question, the Iowa court7 decreed
that the negligence of a party to a contract in not familiarizing himself
with the contents of the instrument signed by him, will not always
1 Hope v. Barham, 28 F. Supp. 561 (V.D. La., 1939); Schweickhardt v. Chessen,
329 Il1. 637, 161 N.E. 118 (1928); Work v. Wagner, 76 Colo. 407, 231 Pac.. 1110 (1925);
Kearns-Gorsuch Bottle Co. v. Hartford-Fairmount Co., 1 F. 2d 318 (S.D. N.Y..
1921); Houchin v. Auracher, 194 Iowa 606,190 N.'W. 3 (1922); In re Miller's Estate, 226
S.W. 302 (Mo. App., 1920); Hart v. Jopling, 146 S.W. 1075 (Tex. Civ. App., 1912);
Grieve v. Grieve, 15 Wyo. 358, 89 Pac. 569 (1907); Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway
Co. v. Cox, 76 Iowa 306, 41 N.W. 24 (1888); Fitzpatrick v. Ringo, 9 Ky. L. Rep.
503, 5 S.W. 431 (1887); Davenport v. Lowry, 78 Ga. 89 (1886); Johnston v. Dunavan,
17 Il1. App. 59 (1885); First Nat'l Bank v. Gough, 61 Ind. 147 (1878).
2 Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Cox, 76 Iowa 306, 41 N.W. 24 (1888).
3 Lloyd v. Hulick, 69 N.J. Eq. 784, 63 Atl. 616 (1906).
4 Hope v. Barham, 28 F. Supp. 561 (W.D. La., 1939).
5 Conrad v. Farmer's Mutual Hail Ins. Association of Iowa, 223 Iowa 828, 273
N.W. 913 (1937).
6 Note 4 supra. 7 Note 5 supra.
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preclude reformation, and the court stated that the degree of negligence
is the point to be considered. Although the courts in these cases where
the degree of negligence is not considered, in no way indicate that their
decision is controlled by the facts of the individual case, some cases lead
one to conclude that their view will not be indiscriminantly applied to
all analogous factual situations. This is most apparent in two cases,"
wherein the idea prevails that the negligent conduct of failing to read
an instrument before signing may be excused, even in the absence of
fraud or mistake. In the one case,9 the party seeking reformation had his
bank prepare a mortage, and relied on them to draw it according to its
terms. They made a detrimental error of one thousand dollars and he
failed to read the instrument. The court expressed the belief that relying
on one's bank in such situations is commonly done and the negligence
would be excused. Likewise, in the second case,10 the court excused
the failure to read after the parties had dictated the terms which were
written by a third person. Thus, what appears to be an irreconcilable
split on substance, may only be a variance dictated by the facts.
The next point upon which some of the courts take an opposing
stand is the effect of mutual mistake or fraud on the negligence of the
party seeking relief. The majority of the courts considering the problem
have held that mutual mistake will nullify the negligence of the parr.'
seeking relief. An excmplification on this result of mutual mistake is to
be found in a rather recent Georgia decision." It was stated therein, that
the negligence of tile complaining party does not necessarily preclude
reformation, if by reason of a common or mutual mistake the instrument
does not express the true agreement.
The contrary view, having but slight support,' 2 stands forth most
clearly in the case of Great Western Manufacturing Company v.
AdawsJ :a In this case a lessee subleased to another with a covenant of
warranty without providing for a right of reversion in the grantor which
Was contained in the master lease. He alleged mutual mistake and sought
rcformation thereof. The court very strictly stated that since the instrii-
inent did not express the complainant's true intent clue to his own neg-
li,,cncc, lie is not entitled to reformation on the grounds of either mistake,
fratid or accident. Such a dccision surely does not seem reasonable in
v-icw (f the fact that the presence of a mutual mistake discloses the
8 'ickard v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 171 Vis. 167, 176 N.\V. 782 (1920);
\Vest %. Suda, 69 Comn. 60, 36 Atl. 1015 (1897).
0 Pickard v. Farmers' & Alcrchants' Bank, 171 WVis. 167, 176 N.V. 782 (1920).
1D West %-. Sod;,, 69 Conn. 60, 36 Afl. 1015 (1897).
1 \V. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. %-. I.chols, 200 Ga. 284, 36 S.E. 2d 762 (1946).
'-'Rushtoll v. I iallett, 8 Utah 277, 30 Pac. 1014 (1892).
13 176 Fed. 325 (C.A. 8th, 1910).
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nonexistence of a manifestation of mutual assent which was rhought to,
be present. To subscribe to this holding would be to support the party
who seeks no change, and is content to perform a contract where tih,
mutual mistake was to his benefit-and punish the party who is wiiinur
to perform the agreement originally intended to be carried out.
With regard to those cases wherein a fraud was perpetrated by rhc
party now defending the request for reformation, a 1942 California de-
cision 14 is a lucid presentation of the view more readily accepted. This
court decreed that a person who has been induced to enter into a contract
by fraud may rescind or reform the contract, and his negligccice in
failing to read the contract does not bar his right to relief. Rrsbtoan v.
Hallett,"5 in contrast, gives a holding not reconcilable with the foregoing
view. The complainant in this case alleged that the defendant grantee
fraudulently included in the deed a second parcel of land that the grantor
did not intend to convey. This court concluded that no relationship of
confidence or trust existed between them, and if the complainant was
imposed upon or defrauded it was through his own negligence, and the
fault rests on him entirely.
As for a unilateral mistake, generally it does not give the erring party
a right to reformation. 16 In California however, certain types of unilateral
mistake and negligence in failing to perceive it, do not prevent the
maintaining of a reformation suit. As set out in one decree, 7 under the
Civil Code of California, reformation of a contract, made through mistake
of one party which at the time of execution the other party knew of or
suspected cannot be defended on the ground that the mistaken party was
negligent in not reading the contract.
Inherent in all the preceding considerations was the prevailing idea
that negligence, in itself, is invariably a bar to reformation. But in adlition
to those cases disagreeing minutely on the question of degree, we hivc
many cases which stand in conflict as to whether negligence in itself is
sufficient.
Thus some courts have taken the position that mere negligence wili
not preclude a party from receiving reformation of his instrument. A
representative case in this group is that of McMabon v. Tanner,6 in
which the grantor of two tracts of land to a brother ant sister deeded
each the other's tract. The brother failed to read his deed at the tio:
14 Security-First Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles v. Earp, 19 Cal. 2d 774, 122 P. 2d ,, (
(1942).
15 8 Utah 277, 30 Pac. 1014 (1892).
10 Hyde v. Kirkpatrick, 78 Ore. 466, 153 Pac. 41 (1915); Pope v. Hoopes, 84 Fed. "'7
(C.A. NJ., 1898).
17 Wilson v. Moriarity, 88 Cal. 207, 26 Pac. 85 (1891).
Is 249 P. 2d 502 (Utah, 1952).
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he accepted and sought to have the deeds reformed. The court held that
the negligence must amount to a violation of a positive legal duty. It
concluded that even clearly established negligence may not of itself be
a sufficient ground for refusing relief, if it appears that the other party
has not been prejudiced thereby. The courts adhering to this rationale
are few in number. 19 However, it does seem to be a very equitable and
logical solution, for it would appear that as long as the other party is
in no way prejudiced by the negligence, there is no reason for denying
to the negligent, but innocent party, the right to a reformation.
This requirement that the negligence amount to a violation of a positive
legal duty before the right to reformation is lost, together with the other
equitable attitude of allowing reformation even then if no prejudice has
resulted, first appeared around the early 1930's. One of the earliest cases
setting forth this view was an Illinois Appellate decision.2 0 In this decision
the defendant (mortgagor), when applying for a mortgage from the
complainant (mortgagee), gave a description of his land which excluded
one quarter of a section by mistake. Complainant sought to have the one
quarter included in the mortgage. The defendant alleged that since com-
plainant failed to read the description and discover the error his neg-
ligence precluded his right to relief. The court concluded that the neg-
ligence must amount to a violation of a legal duty, and that the party
against whom the reformation is sought to be enforced must have suf-
fered a loss because of such negligence, before reformation will be denied.
The present Illinois view must not be assumed to be that set forth in
this decision however, for subsequently the Illinois courts did undergo
a few changes of mind. Prior to 1931, the Illinois case precedent was a
very early Illinois Appellate decision. 21 This case was in conformance with
decisions looking upon negligence in itself as a bar, and the court, without
considering the degree of negligence, stated that negligence on the part
of the complaining party destroys his right to reformation. This attitude
was again substantiated in an Illinois Supreme Court decision in 1928,22
wherein the court stated that to justify reformation of a written contract
it must appear that the party seeking such relief was free from negligence.
The first change was brought about in 1931,23 when the Illinois Ap-
19 Meyer v. Young, 23 Wash. 2d 109, 159 P. 2d 908 (1945); Greenfield v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 75 Ohio App. 122, 61 N.E. 2d 226 (1944); Ward v. Lyman, 108 Vt.
464, 188 At. 892 (1937); Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Kenshalo, 258 Il1. App. 1
(1930).
20Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Kenshalo, 258 111. App. 1 (1930).
21 Johnston v. Dunavan, 17 111. App. 59 (1885).
22 Schweickhardt v. Chessen, 329 Ill. 637, 161 N.E. 118 (1928).
23 Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Kenshalo, 258 II. App. 1 (1930).
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pellate Court, as noted above, subscribed to the requirement that the
negligence must be a violation of a legal duty with prejudice resulting
to the defending party. This view was immediately altered by the Illinois
Supreme Court in the following year.24 Therein, the court reaffirmed
the concept that negligence to vitiate reformation must amount to a
violation of a legal duty; however, the Supreme Court did not adhere
to the Appellate Court's conclusion that relief would nevertheless be
granted if no prejudice was present. The court merely stated that to
constitute such negligence as will be sufficient to prevent reformation
of an instrument, it must be shown to have been of such a gross nature
as to amount to a violation of a legal duty.
This holding was applied in a subsequent case,25 and recently in
Korosic v. Pearson.26 In this latter case, two brothers, Steve and Edward
Korosic, owned a parcel of land in joint tenancy-thirty-three feet of
which had been dedicated for street purposes. The brothers decided to
divide the land, each to take one half. In so doing they ignored the
thirty-three feet of dedicated land and divided only the remaining por-
tion. Edward Korosic received the half abutted by the dedicated thirty-
three feet. Through subsequent conveyances the defendant Pearson be-
came owner and had a survey made. This survey brought to light the
forgotten thirty-three feet. Steve Korosic then sought reformation of
the original partition so as to give him an extra sixteen and one half feet.
The defendant alleged negligence on complainant's part as a bar to relief.
It was stated by the court that to constitute such negligence as would
be sufficient to prevent reformation of an instrument it must be shown
to have been of such a gross nature as to amount to a violation of a
legal duty.
At present, the last mentioned case appears to be the Illinois view.
However, there are really too few Illinois cases in point upon which to
predicate a definite stand. Also, it would be difficult to attempt an
analysis of the cause of all the foregoing variations, since reformation is
a child of equity and the results in equity are the offspring of the
chancellor's mental discretion. In light of this, the transition in the courts
of any jurisdiction, cannot necessarily prognosticate a possible trend, as
it may well only indicate equity's vacillation with the times-negligence
today being of far more common occurrence than in by-gone days, the
present attitude may merely be de minimum non curat lex.
2 4 Pearce v. Osterman, 343 I11. 175, 175 N.E. 416 (1931).
25 Anderson v. Pettigrew Foundry Co., 297 I11. App. 14, 17 N.E. 2d 60 (1938).
26 377 Il1. 413, 36 N.E. 2d 744 (1941).
